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S.: Can a Lessee Be Compelled to Apportion Oil Royalties Among Owners
BDITORIAL NOTES

v. Southern Oil Oo.5 is disapproved and it is a decision which would
have no application had the court intended to base its decision on
the ratification of the lease by Kemper. If the court did intend to
hold that a wronged tenant in common whose oil has been taken by
a lessee under a lease by his co-tenant can recover as damages only
the usual royalty provided in oil and gas leases, it is submitted
that the decision is unsound.0 If the tenant in common owns an
undivided half the oil in the ground it is hard to see why he
should lose seven eighths of his property because a lessee of his cotenant wrongfully extracts his oil and why the parties guilty of
the tort should in such case be permitted to profit from their own
wrong. Why may not the wronged party base his action on the
tort instead of being compelled to ratify the contract? The above
remarks are made with some diffidence because the writer is not
sure that it was not the intention of the court to hold Kemper had
ratified the lease.
-J. W. S.

CAN A LESSEE BE COMPELLED TO APPORTION OIL ROYALTIEs

PREMIsES.-Since the
publication of the note on the apportionment of oil and gas royalties in the WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY,' a criticism
of the principles contended for in the note has been made by the
counsel for a large oil and gas company which operates in a sister
state. He contends that the cases of Wetengel v. Gormley2 and
Campbell v. Lynch3 are correctly decided because these cases inAMONG OWNERS OF PORTIONS OF THE LEASED

661 W. Va. 538, 56 S. E. 888 (1907).
The rule as stated by the court in the
principal case also seems inconsistent with williamson v. Jones, supra and McNeely v.
South Penn Oil Co., supra.
GThe cases apparently relied on as authorities are South Penn Oil Co. V. Haught,
71 W. Vs. 720, 78 S. E. 759 (1913) and Cecil v. Clark, 49 -W. Va. 459, 39 S. E.
In the former case the court allowed recovery of the usual royalty
202 (1901).
where it .appeared the cost of production largely exceeded the value of the oil produced. In the latter the plaintiffs sued to recover a share of the royalties which
had been paid to the defendant by the lessee, hence the lease had lbeen ratified by
the plaintiffs. It is submitted these two cases tend to support the statement heretofore made that the injured party should have he right to elect whether to proceed on the theory of tort or on the contract.
'25 W. VA L. Q. 231.
2160 Pa. St. 559, 28 Ati. 934 (1894), and 184 Pa. St. 354, 34 At. 57 (1998).
S94 S. E. 739 (W. Va. 1918). A note on this case appeared in a recent number
of the HARVARr LAw RvEw. See 31 HAP.v. L. Rnv. 882. In this note it is stated
the result reached is sound because the right to the royalties at the time of the partition was contingent on the discovery of oil and therefore there was nothing to
partition but the land, and when the right to the royalties did vest it vested in all
the heirs in common. But it 'was stated that had the right to thd royalties been
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volve oil royalties while all the cases contra involve mere royalties
on gas wells; that where the royalty provided is a share of the production, as in the case of oil, the cost to the lessee of the operation
of the premises would be greatly increased if he were compelled to
keep track of the production of each of the portions into which
the premises might be divided, and to pay each part-owner the
royalty on the production of his portion. The following excerpt
from the letter of the eminent counsel will suffice to make clear
the nature of the contention:
"We contend that the lease, as executed in the first instance, is an entirety and that the lessor cannot divide up the
leased premises, or apportion the same out to many different
grantees, or assignees, and thereby increase the burden ten
fold that the lessee accepted in the first instance as the measure of his duty and the limitation of the investment necessary
to gather all the oil.
"As a practical question, how is the grantee of a portion
to get his oil from the particular part assigned to him if the
lessee does not build separate tankage and separate steaming
plants. In one practical, concrete case involving a fine property, we have figured that the transfers already made would
cost us one hundred thousand dollars additional in two years,
if we recognized the same to the extent that the assignees
could get the royalties due from separate tracts. If for one
moment it could be urged that we might be compelled to do
this extra work from time to time, I would like to inquire into
how many portions, and to what extent a one hundred and
sixty acre tract could be so divided?
"There is the other question, also, of compelling the lessee
to recognize the new boundary lines thus created through his
lease by such transfers. If he was compelled to do this, they
could simply put him out of business and destroy the full
benefits of the contract that he had entered into with the
original lessors. On the other hand, if the lessee is not bound
to recognize these new lines drawn through the leased premises by such sales of a portion thereof, then an assignee of a
portion might suffer if any other rule was adopted than that
laid down in Pennsylvania and west Virginia. A transferee
of a portion of the leased premises could not bring an action
to set aside the lease." 4
vested at the time of the partition then the division among the heirs would have
been res adjvdicata. The point suggested though arguable seems by no means free
from
doubt.
4
Citing Cochran v,. Gulf Refining Co., 139 La. 1010, 72 So. 718. (1916) ; Jameson
V. Chanslor-Canfleld Midway Oil Co., 167 Pac. 369 (Cal. 1917) ; Nabors t. Producers
Oil Co., 140 La. 985, 74 So. 527 (1917).
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The question as to whether the lessee can be compelled to make
such apportionment is an interesting one. But it seems clear that
the question was not involved in Wetengel v. Gormley, while in
OampbeZl v. Lynch the lessee was a party defendant and opposed
the view taken by the court, apparently untroubled by the considerations suggested above. It is submitted there is nothing in
either case to indicate the court was in any way influenced by possible detriment to the lessee. The lessee in neither case raised any
such objection and if the court considered it, then the court must
have taken judicial notice of the manner in which oil is usually produced by a lessee and from this concluded there would be increased
burdens imposed on the lessee. Is this a thing of which a court
should take judicial notice? It would seem not, particularly in
view of the fact that in the only two cases that have arisen the
lessee involved did not even raise the question. Furthermore,
neither case decides that the premises cannot be divided so as to
give the owner of each part the right to the royalty produced from
his portion but on the contrary, the opinion in the case of Campbell v. Lynch clearly intimates that such division might be made by
agreement of the lessor and his assignees. It is therefore submitted that there is no case which in any degree denies the right of
the lessor to divide the premises and assign to the owner of each
portion the royalty on the oil produced from such portion.
Whether the lessee can be compelled to make such apportionment
is an open question.
But suppose a ease should arise in which the lessee appears and
contends the apportionment of royalties on the basis of the production of each portion cannot be imposed on the lessee because it
would substantially increase his burdens. It is submitted that if
it were proved that the burdens of the lessee would not be substantially increased then the grantee of a portion of the leased premises, in the absence of express agreement, should be entitled to the
royalties on the oil actually produced from his land. On the other
hand, if it were proved that the burdens of the lessee would be substantially increased by so apportioning the royalties, then such
lessee cannot be compelled to so apportion them. An oil and gas
lease in so far as it creates a profit in the land is a conveyance, but
it is a contract in so far as the provisions for the payment of
royalties are concerned. A party to a contract is often compelled
to do things he has not strictly agreed to do if not burdensome.
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For example, he may have to pay the half of a sum of money to
each of two men when he agreed to pay over the entire sum to one
Pian. It has long been settled law that if the reversion is severed
the tenant must pay the rent to the owners of the parts in proportion to the rental value of such parts."
In the early cases on the apportionment of the rent on severance of the reversion we find the argument made by the lessee that
such apportionment would compel him to do something he had not
contracted to do, that is, pay the rent in parts to two or more
when he had contracted to pay it all to one party and that this
would be more burdensome to him. This argument did not prevail and the rent was apportioned though this was in fact permitting the assignment of a contracts and contracts were not assignable at that time. If a case had ever arisen where the lessee could
have proved that if he were compelled to make such apportionment
of the rent he would have to do something really burdensome that
he had not contracted to do, it is quite probable the apportionment
would not have been allowed. Likewise the rule should not be applied by analogy to oil and gas leases if it would substantially increase the burdens of the lessee. The writer confesses a lack of
knowledge of the practical side of oil production and the statements of the eminent counsel as to the immensely increased cost
of apportioning the royalties came as a surprise. The writer was
under the impression that oil operators always kept careful record
of the production of each well. If so, under the ordinary lease
where the lessee may deliver the royalty oil in the pipe line to the
credit of the lessor or his assignees, the apportionment of oil to
a partial assignee of the premises on the basis of the production of
his portion would certainly be little more burdensome than paying
a part of the rent due on a lease to a partial assignee of the reversion. It would be easy to determine the production of each tract
and to cxedit each owner with his share of the royalties. But the
argument of eminent counsel would certainly apply if the lessee
by the terms of the lease were compelled to furnish tanks and
would have to deliver the royalty oil to the assignees of the lessor
in separate tanks. But it is hard to see why, if the production of
each well were known, the royalty oil should not be delivered in
one tank, the assignees being tenants in common of the contents.
In any case where it is found that a substantial detriment would be
5See cases cited in 25 W. VA. L. Q. 233, note 17.
6See Ards v. Watkins, Cro. Eliz. 637, 651 (1598, 1599).

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol25/iss4/7

4

S.: Can a Lessee Be Compelled to Apportion Oil Royalties Among Owners
EDITOBIAL NOTES

suffered by the lessee if apportionment were required on the basis
of the production of each parcel of the premises no such apportionment should be allowed without the consent of the lessee, for
the simple reason he should not be compelled to perform substantially more than he has contracted to perform.
As to the matter of development it is clear the lessee can be compelled to develop the premises leased with reasonable diligence and
his duty in this respect cannot be changed without his consent. It
was suggested in the previous note that in Campbell v. Lynch the
plaintiff's tract of land was so large that he possibly would not be
without remedy against the lessee if there was failure to develop
his portion. The lessee was bound to develop the whole tract
reasonably and if he developed five tracts and did not drill any
wells on the sixth tract (which contained over eighty acres) certainly the owner of such tract should have relief in equity because
this would be a breach of the implied covenant to develop the entire tract diligently. Courts which have established an exception
to the settled rule of law that a court of equity will not enter a
decree in aid of a forfeiture would not be likely to deny relief in
such a case at suit of the assignee of a portion of the leased premises because of an old and technical rule of law as to the enforcement of rights of entry for condition broken.
-- J. W. S.
SPONTANEOUS EXCLAMATIONS v. RES GEsTtE.-Perhaps no phrase
in the whole field of evidence is the subject of so much misuse as
the mystic shibboleth "res gestae." For many years the phrase
has been quite generally used as a convenient "catch-all" to cover,
for purposes of admissibility, many hearsay statements which the
courts, by a sort of judicial intuition, have felt should be admitted, but, at the same time, have failed to assign as a reason for
their admission any more satisfactory explanation than the timeworn, empty assertion that they are "a part of the res gestae."
The phrase seems to be a relic of the days (not long since) when
there was a general belief in so-called solving words and juristic
conceptions-a belief, which, as a matter of legal history, generally
obtains in the early periods of legal growth. In the development
of the law, however, changes in conditions require changes in legal
rules and conceptions, and, hence the modern tendency to break
'See James Bradley Thayer, 15 Am. L. Rviv. 1, 5 et seq.
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